Composite indicator of German regional policy and its use for optimizing subsidies to regional labour markets by Tangian, Andranik S.
www.ssoar.info
Composite indicator of German regional policy and
its use for optimizing subsidies to regional labour
markets
Tangian, Andranik S.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Tangian, A. S. (2005). Composite indicator of German regional policy and its use for optimizing subsidies to regional
labour markets. (WSI-Diskussionspapier, 138). Düsseldorf: Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut in der
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-315945
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Composite indicator of German regional
policy and its use for optimizing subsidies
to regional labour markets1
Andranik S. Tangian
Diskussionspapier Nr. 138
July 2005
Privatdozent Dr. Dr. Andranik Tangian
WSI in der Hans Bo¨ckler Stiftung
Hans-Bo¨ckler-Straße 39
D-40476 Du¨sseldorf
Tel: +49 211 7778-259
Fax: +49 211 7778-190
Andranik-Tangian@Boeckler.De
WSI-Diskussionspapiere (Print) ISSN 1861-0625
WSI-Diskussionspapiere (Internet) ISSN 1861-0633
1Based on papers at the 57th Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society, Lisboa,
March 10–13, 2004, at the 7th International Conference of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare,
Osaka, July 21–25, 2004, and at the Erich-Schneider-Seminar, University of Kiel, April 11, 2005.
2
Abstract
German structural policy is characterized by a composite indicator with three targets:
(1) minimization of unemployment, (2) maximization of GDP, and (3) equalization of
regional unemployment rates. The composite indicator with given target weights is max-
imized subject to budget constraints and some administrative restrictions. The optimal
combinations of target indices obtained for variable weight ratios are to be considered by
a policy maker who thereby makes the final choice among already optimized outcomes,
not being burdened with adjusting the target weights. The optimization is performed for
econometric predictions-2004 which are derived from regional data for 1994–2002.
Comparing with the optimal budget distribution, the efficiency of the actual “manual”
budget distribution in 2000–2002 is about 4%, that is, the results actually obtained for 6
Bio. EUR could be obtained for 241Mio. EUR (= 4% of the actual budget). Such a bad
implementation of active labour market policies can be responsible for their low efficiency
reported in some empirical studies and misinterpreted as their uselessness. Besides, it is
found that the most productive jobs (most contributing to GDP) require least subsidies.
Finally, taxes expected from new jobs allow to consider the problem from a managerial
viewpoint. In particular, the government can maximize tax returns from investments in
labour market policies.
Keywords: European Commission, structural funds, regional policy, active labour
market policies, equalizing regional unemployment rates, economic growth, optimal plan-
ning, governmental management.
JEL classification: C33, H25, J68, R00, R15.
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1 Introduction
Structural and regional policy Increasing employment, stimulating economic growth,
and reducing disparities among regions are objectives of both German and European struc-
tural and regional policies. In recent years multi-billion national and European grants
were given to bring regional unemployment down to the national average by creating
new and/or safeguarding existing jobs. In particular, a European grant within Structural
Funds’ Objective 1 (European Commission 2005) contributes to the German governmen-
tal program for equalizing regional unemployment (Deutscher Bundestag 2002, Tetsch et
al. 1996), which also contributes to reducing the general unemployment and to increasing
GDP due to new jobs.
Equalization of unemployment resembles the stabilization of an airplane. The stabi-
lizer consumes some energy but is necessary to provide a safe flight. The equalization of
unemployment takes resources from active labor market policies but is required to prevent
structural disproportions.
Limited resources naturally tempt to subsidize ‘cheap’ jobs which need less subsidies
rather than the jobs which are ‘expensive’ for grant-givers. The evident reason is that
then more jobs can be created or safeguarded. Since the amount of aid per job depends
on specific regional industries and services, certain regions can be little supported, while
others get too much aid. This decreases the national unemployment but increases the
disparity among regions. Besides, large deviations from the starting point make accurate
predictions impossible putting in question the model adequacy. Thus, equalization of
regional unemployment rates is important not only to avoid structural disproportions but
also to keep the situation under operational control.
It should be emphasized that no budget distribution among 271 regions can be opti-
mized ‘manually’, without modern computational facilities. Even simplest decisions ”to
subsidize the region or not” result in 2271 distribution variants which number much sur-
passes the number of atoms in the Universe. Such a huge number of possibilities leaves
no chance to solve the problem by any normative ‘manual’ rule.
Regional unemployment The regional unemployment rate is one of most important
indicators of socio-economical equilibrium. It characterizes the regional governmental
performance and serves as a governmental assistance criterion. Moreover, its equalization
all over the country is expected to improve national output as well as to decrease inflation
pressure (Taylor 1996).
According to Fothergill (2001) and Elhorst (2003), the unemployment disparity among
regions within countries is becoming a source of trouble in the European Union. They
are getting comparable with that among the countries themselves (Elhorst 1995, Taylor
and Bradley 1997, European Commission 1999). The extension of the European Union
to the East, where the economical imbalance is aggravated by transition processes, makes
this problem even more acute.
Comparing with unemployment at national and international levels, regional unem-
ployment is relatively little studied. The 3630 page Handbook of Labor Economics (Ashen-
felter and Layard 1986, Ashenfelter and Card 1999) contains nothing on regional unem-
ployment, and the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics contains only a half-
relevant chapter on urban unemployment (Crampton 1999). All of this illustrates how far
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the topic is from the mainstream research.
The belief that the nature of regional unemployment is similar to that of unemployment
in general is rather superficial. The factors which are thought to explain disparities among
countries (e.g., Phelps 1994, Malinvaud 1994, Bean 1994, OECD 1994, Scarpetta 1996),
like institutions of wage bargaining, social security, retirement, and taxes are not relevant
to regions. Indeed, they differ between countries but not between regions within countries;
consequently some other factors should exist.
Elhorst (2003) has reviewed 41 empirical studies, where regional unemployment dif-
ferentials are explained with the help of regional data. These models (not necessarily
formal) are classified as follows:
1. Single equation models (one independent and one dependent variable):
(a) empirical models, mostly with no equations but nevertheless suggesting factors
which might be used as explanatory variables,
(b) the inverse unemployment-vacancy relationship, or the Beveridge curve (e.g.,
Jones and Manning 1992, Holzer 1993),
(c) the cyclical sensitivity model which explains the regional unemployment as a
linear function of the national unemployment; such a model makes sense if
the regional and national unemployment cointegrate in the sense of Engle and
Granger (1987) into an equilibrium configuration (e.g., Chapman 1991, Martin
1997, Baddeley et al. 1998),
(d) the amenity model which explains the regional unemployment as a function of
aggregated attractiveness of the regions, for instance, reflected by the wage-to-
infrastructure-index ratio (e.g., Marston 1985, Montgomery 1993).
2. Implicit models
(a) the migration-based model which explains the regional unemployment by mi-
gration flows (e.g., Molho 1995, Groenewold 1997),
(b) the NAIRU model (= non-accelerating inflation rates of unemployment), or the
Phillips and wage-setting curves (e.g., Jones and Hyclak 1989, Payne 1995),
(c) the Blanchard–Katz model (1992) with four equations which links the regional
unemployment rate to labor supply, labor demand, wage-setting, and migration
of both population and firms; a similar study on the regional unemployment
in the European Union is performed by Decressin and Fata´s (1995).
3. The accounting identity models which are based on estimating the impact
of a single individual, depending on his identification either as a local unemployed,
or migrant, in-commuter, or out-commuter, etc. (e.g., Burridge and Gordon 1981,
Gordon 1988, Gordijn and Wissen 1992, Wissen and Ekamper 1995).
4. The simultaneous models with interactions, which take into account the
feedback of the regional unemployment to the explanatory labor market variables,
like the labor force participation rate, degree of employment and earnings, labor
demand, etc. (e.g., Bilger et al. 1991, Blackaby and Manning 1992).
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As concluded by Elhorst, the models reviewed provide clear-cut trends in the inter-
action between the regional unemployment and other labor market variables. It should
be noted however that these models directly or indirectly assume a kind of labor market
equilibrium, which is a certain idealization. The factors which violate the equilibrium,
like governmental creation of new jobs, are not explicitly taken into account.
Active labor market policies Active labor market policies are aimed at reducing
unemployment and are implemented in all developed countries (Fay 1996, Heckman et al.
1999, Martin 2000, Steiner and Hagen 2002). They fall into three main schemes.
1. Job creation is offering subsidies to wages mainly for short-running projects in non-
profit organizations. These jobs are often given to former long-term unemployed
and are usually restricted to terms of about one year.
2. Structural adjustments is also offering wage subsidies but with other goals and in a
closer collaboration with private firms. The subsidies are aimed at integrating the
employees into the main activities and are given for terms of about three years.
3. Public training consists of educational measures paid by the employment office.
They are aimed at improving the chances for employment and increasing the em-
ployment stability.
According to Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (2003b), during the period of 1990–2002 only
in East Germany 6.5 Mio workers, which is about the number of active employees, were
involved in these programs with the overall budget of 138 billion EURO. Expenditures of
this size require systematic analysis of their effects.
Microeconomic studies are based on comparisons between groups of participants and
groups of non-participants; for surveys see Hagen and Steiner (2000) and Hujer and
Caliendo (2001). As follows from these surveys, there is no clear evidence of either positive,
or negative effects of the German active labor market policies on the future prospects of
the participants. This indefiniteness has been also confirmed by the recent report based
on large administrative data (Hujer et al. 2003).
Hagen (2003) criticizes the microeconomic approach for its stable unit treatment value
assumption (Rubin 1980). In the given context it means that the control groups of non-
participants are not affected by the programs. Since the programs are very extensive,
their indirect effects on the non-participants are likely to be quite significant. It implies
a violation of the basic assumption, making questionable their results.
The macroeconomic approach, on the contrary, assumes simultaneity and reciprocal
influence of all factors within the economy. Several authors selected it as more appropriate
for estimating the indirect and net effects of active labor market policies (Heckman et al.
1999). However, macroeconomic studies based on regional data reveal no unambiguous
trends either (Bu¨ttner and Pray 1998, Steiner et al. 1998, Hagen and Steiner 2000, Schmid
et al. 2001, Blien et al. 2002, Fertig et al. 2002, Hagen 2003).
In the most recent study Hagen (2003) applied three macroeconomic approaches to
East German regional data:
• an augmented matching function approach which evaluates the effects of the active
labor market policies on regional matching efficiency,
9
• a reduced-form approach based on the Beveridge curve which assesses the effects
on the regional job seeker rate, including both unemployed and participants in the
active labor market policies,
• a regional labor demand approach.
The main findings were a certain negative effect of job creation and no significant effect
of structural adjustments and of public training on the regional employment. In spite of
having used alternative approaches, a number of questions remained open.
It should be noticed that both micro- and macro- modelling do not take account of
such general factors as accelerating technological transformations with new requirements
to the employees, support of Eastern Europe and globalization which channelled financial
flows out of developed countries and moved some industries and services to the Third
World, and the recession which started in Asia in the mid-1990s and then expanded to
the West. Their negative implications can mask the positive effect of the active labor
market policies, without which the labor market situation might become much worse.
Structural policy and optimization Much less attention is paid to the quality of
realizing governmental programs (Bradley et al. 2003). According to Lechner and Smith
(2003), “caseworkers do not do a very good job of allocating their unemployed clients
to the subprograms so as to maximize their subsequent employment prospects.” A bad
implementation of subsidizing policies (= non-optimal resource allocation with respect to
objectives) can be responsible for their low efficiency reported in some empirical studies
and misinterpreted as their uselessness.
In a market economy, underused possibilities and non-optimal behavior often cause
redistributions and structural shifts which can lead away from the results expected. For
instance, an imbalanced job creation in one region causes migrations to the region, im-
plying that the regional unemployment rate decreases much less than intended.
Lechner and his colleagues (2003) took part in developing an expert system which
customizes the offer for each particular unemployed client. This may be the only (and
unconscious!) instance of any kind of optimization approach in the vast research on active
labor market policies2.
Such a general neglect of optimization methods is amazing in two respects. The role
which optimization plays in the modern economy is hard to overestimate (Samuelson
1971). The market economy optimizes itself being guided by ‘the invisible hand’, Adam
Smith’s (1776) metaphor for competition. However, it is not the case of public sector with
its central planning and governmental budget programs. The problems here range from
simple inefficiency to non-optimal interventions into market economy which destroy its
self-regulation. Consequently, optimization should be primarily used in the public sector
and particularly in the domain discussed.
On the other hand, almost all quantitative studies on unemployment are essentially
econometrical. Yet the founders of econometrics, the first winners of the Nobel Prize
in economics 1969, Jan Tinbergen and Ragnar Frisch, always linked econometrics to
2In a personal communication Lechner was somewhat surprised to learn about the optimization in-
terpretation of his work. Elhorst after having compiled a comprehensive survey was not aware of any
optimization approach.
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optimization. Among other things, both Tinbergen and Frisch were faced with unem-
ployment problems and in the 1950s made pioneering contributions to econometric opti-
mization models (Frisch 1963, Tinbergen 1952, 1956, see also Johansen 1974); this topic
was selected by Frisch for his Nobel Address (1970). Consequently, there are also his-
torical prerequisites for interactions between unemployment studies, econometrics, and
optimization.
In econometric optimization models the desired is represented by the objective func-
tion and the feasible by econometric equations which restrict economic indices to certain
attainable combinations. Their interaction results in the optimal decision. In a sense, op-
timization adds an active element, the choice, to descriptive econometric models, making
the next step in controlling the situation.
Econometric decision models Just this philosophy was developed by R. Frisch and
J. Tinbergen. For the first time, the term ‘decision model’ (= econometric optimization
model) was used in Frisch’s work for the United Nations Economic and Employment
Commission in 1949 (Bjerkholt and Strøm 2002). This work was published as late as in
1955 and the idea of decision models became popular owing to Tinbergen’s On the Theory
of Economic Policy (1952) where he acknowledged Frisch’s priority. Both Tinbergen
and Frisch strongly promoted the so-called quadratic-linear approach with a quadratic
objective function maximized or minimized subject to linear constraints.
The bottle-neck was the objective function, and Frisch (1957, 1971) suggested the
Multiplex Method to construct it from interviews. In the mid-1950s he conducted “well
planned interviews” with the Norwegian Minister of Finance Trygve Bratteli who became
Prime Minister for the Labour Party in the early 1970s. Later this approach was ten-
tatively used by Van Eijk and Sandee (1959), Chossudovsky (1972a–b), Van der Geest
(1977), Merkies and Nijman (1983), Van Daal and Merkies (1984), Merkies and Hofkies
(1991), Hu¨sges and Gruber (1991), and Medelin, Aspedale and Pachio (1994).
Frisch intended objective functions for decision models, but these plans had few suc-
cessors. Frisch’s ideas were not really elaborated but only discussed by Hallet and Rees
(1983), Rustem and Velupillai (1984), Hughes Hallet (1991), and some others. In par-
ticular, Oswald (1985) explained perspectives of using econometric decision models for
the wage formation. Recovering objective functions of trade union leaders and of leaders
of employer’s associations were supposed to imply the tradeoff between wage level and
unemployment.
Tinbergen payed a considerable attention to econometric decision models but was
inclined to derive the objective function from the formulation of the problem rather than
from interviews (Kol and de Wolf 1993). Many of his objective functions are linear,
but some are quadratic. It is the case of the model with fixed targets (= the ideal
combination of variables), where the distance to the given point is minimized (Tinbergen
1956).3 Tinbergen’s approach was further developed by Theil (1964), Fox et al. (1966),
3Rigorously speaking, it is difficult to avoid subjectivity even here. The distance in the econometric
space is ill-defined. Axes are measured in different units like percent of inflation, number of jobs, Mio.
dollar, etc. Even expressing all quantities in percent is of little help, since, for instance, one percent
of inflation and one percent of unemployment can be hardly compared. Determining their substitution
rates brings the problem back to Frisch’s interviews. The question is relevant to regression models which
fit hyperplanes to points with heterogeneous coordinates. Therefore, Frish’s thoughts deal also with the
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Chow (1975) and other leading economists.
Tinbergen’s view at econometric decision models was ‘more objectivistic’ than that
of Frisch. Deriving objective functions from sources other than interviews looked more
impartial and ‘scientific’. Sharing this standpoint, several authors revealed objective func-
tions from panel data, in particular from tradeoffs observed. These studies are however
not quite relevant to proper decision models, since they are not aimed at finding decisions
but operate on the ones already made (like consumer choices). Moreover, a ‘decision’ is
regarded as a kind of equilibrium-based optimization which is not exactly the subject of
decision models. For a survey of related works see Dantzig at al. (1989a–b) where the
objective function of the U.S. economy is constructed.
Tinbergen and his successors often considered abstract objective functions for ana-
lytical purposes, without numerically determining their coefficients. The linear-quadratic
decision model which seemed quite operational was rather a theoretical framework. Per-
sistent Frisch’s efforts to develop methods for constructing objective functions were not
more than practice-oriented. As concluded by Bjerkholt (the editor of selected essays by
R.Frisch) and Strøm (2002), “Frisch left this field of interest with work undone”.
Objective functions and composite indicators In subsequent years the situation
did not improve much. A number of experiments are reported by Merkies and colleagues;
see Merkies (2002) for a survey. Special methods for constructing quadratic and additive
objective functions are developed by Tangian (2002, 2004).
A new wave of interest to constructing objective functions emerged due to the propa-
gation of composite indicators which appear in numerous world-wide documents (United
Nations 2001–, International Institute for Management Development 2000–, World Eco-
nomic Forum 2002–, OECD 2002–2004). On October 2001 the European Commission
recommended to develop composite indicators for certain purposes within the Structural
Indicators Exercise (European Commission 2001a) which was followed by the report (Eu-
ropean Commission 2002b). As emphasized by the OECD (2003, p. 3),
Composite indicators are valued for their ability to integrate large amounts of
information into easily understood formats for a general audience. . . Despite
their many deficiencies, composite indicators will continue to be developed
due to their usefulness. . .
Composite indicators are highly appreciated in international comparisons, where it is
often required to surmount national particularities and to bring the consideration to the
common denominator. As noted by Munda and Nardo (2003, p. 2),
Composite indicators stem from the need to rank countries and benchmarking
their performance whenever a country does not perform strictly better than
another. Composite indicators are very common in fields such as economic
and business statistics (e.g., the OECD Composite Leading Indicators) and
are used in a variety of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness, sus-
tainable development, quality of life assessment, globalization and innovation
(see Cox and others 1992, Huggins 2003, Wilson and Jones 2002, Guerard
general adequacy of econometric equations.
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2001, Fa¨re et al. 1994, Lovell et al. 1995, Griliches 1990 and Saisana and
Tarantola 2002, among others). . . A general objective of most of these indica-
tors is the ranking of countries according to some aggregated dimensions (see
Cherchye 2001 and Kleinknecht 2002).
A composite indicator is defined to be a weighted sum of several first-level indica-
tors which weights reflect their substitution rates; see European Commission (2002c, p.
79), OECD (2003, p. 5), and Munda and Nardo (2003, p. 2). In other words, composite
indicators are simplest objective functions. Specificity of composite indicators, their ty-
pology, requirements for input data, principles of weight assignments, and other issues are
reviewed by Bossel (1999), Huggins (2003), and Saisana and Tarantola (2002). Practical
aspects of composite indicators are outlined in brief guides by the OECD (2002, 2003),
Pastille (2002), and Sendzimir (2004).
The difference between composite indicators and objective functions (= utility func-
tions) is rather methodological. The latter are used to represent individual or social
preferences. Composite indicators reflect development of and differences between alter-
natives; they however are also often charged with a better/worse inclination. In this case
they are at the same time objective functions, even if considered outside of optimization
models (“Indicators create leverage power that can change the future”; see Sendzimir
2004, p. 4). To provide compatibility of scales, composite indicators are defined in stan-
dardized input variables. This is equally relevant to objective functions but only less
emphasized. In most cases both terms are synonyms but “composite indicator” may just
better fit to the linguistic context. For instance, it is more natural to speak of a composite
indicator of regional performance which contributes to that of national performance than
of a utility sub-function.
Due to some fundamental difficulties of preference aggregation in multi-criteria analy-
sis (Arrow and Raynaud 1986), universal constructing methods exist neither for objective
functions, nor for composite indicators. In each case their construction is much deter-
mined by the particular application, includes both formal and heuristic elements, and
incorporates some expert knowledge on the phenomenon; see proceedings of dedicated
conferences on composite indicators organized by the Joint Research Center of European
Communities and the OECD (Saltelli 2003a–b and Hoffmann 2004).
Regardless of the progress in constructing objective functions and composite indica-
tors, building an econometric decision model still remains to be a kind of art. Firstly, it
needs a specific knowledge of the subject domain. Secondly, selecting important factors,
sorting out secondary ones, and formalizing ill-defined notions, relations, and preferences
by variables, equalities, inequalities, and functions requires intuition and inventiveness.
Thirdly, configuring sophisticated optimization methods into a consistent model needs
mathematical skills. Finally, the whole construct must be mathematically manageable
and computable.
About the given work The given work combines methods for constructing objective
functions and composite indicators with the ideology of econometric decision models. The
whole is aimed at optimizing a large-scale budgeting program of governmental subsidies
to regional labour markets.
At present Germany is divided into 271 labor market regions, 204 in West Germany
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and 67 in East Germany. The European employment policy restricts the regions to be
supported to 23.4% of the total population (Crome and Schwengler 2000, Hassold and
Jung 2000). Taking into account economic difficulties in East Germany, all its regions are
eligible, and the budget is separate for West and East Germany. During the control period
1994–2002 all eligible regions received yearly about 2.0–2.8 Bio EUR; West Germany
received about 250–280 Mio, about 1/9, and East Germany — 2.0–2.5.1 Bio, 8/9 of the
total. It should be mentioned that some West German regions were eligible for a few
years or for one year only, and some regions were not eligible at all. It implies fewer data
on West Germany and blanks in corresponding data tables.
In the given paper we develop an econometric decision model for redistributing the
aid among eligible regions in East and West Germany. The optimization is performed to
increase in (a) employment and (b) GDP as well as (c) to equalize regional unemployment
rates, according to the goals of European and national structural policies. The model
operates on regional indicators 1994-2002 available from Bundesamt fu¨r Wirtschaft und
Ausfuhrkontrolle (2003), Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (2003a), and Statistisches Bundesamt
(2003). It consists of three main blocks:
1. Econometric predictions: Explaining regional indices as functions in
year and regional subsidies
Effects of active labor market policies on the regional indices, in particular on unem-
ployment, have been outlined in Section 1. As revealed by Hagen (2003) and several
other authors, the regional unemployment rates depend on the subsidies granted to
the regions. For our study, we use the simplest linear estimation directly derived
from the available statistical figures.
2. Budget optimization for the situation predicted
• Operationalizing the target variables
The econometric regional prediction of unemployment and the increase in GDP
imply simple linear expressions for the national unemployment rate and the
GDP gain. The unemployment disparity among regions is defined to be the
variance of regional unemployment rates.
The criterion of least variance, not always explicitly, is used in models of mar-
ket stabilization (Gruber 1965, 1967), general economic stabilization (Pindyck
1973, Friedman 1975), and optimal control (Chow 1975, Blanchard and Fischer
1989).
• Expressing the target variables in regional subsidies
The linear econometric equations, having been substituted into linear expres-
sions for national unemployment or GDP gain, and in the quadratic expression
for the variance, do not affect their (polynomial) degree. This means that
the first two target variables, having been expressed in the regional subsidies,
remain linear functions, and the third target variable, the variance, remains
quadratic.
• Normalizing the target variables
To avoid scaling effects and to surmount the heterogeneity of units of measure-
ment, the target variables are reduced to the standard range 0–1.
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• Composite indicator of regional policy as the objective function
The objective function is defined to be a composite indicator of regional policy.
Consequently, it is a weighted sum of the three target variables expressed in
subsidies to regions. The target weights, reflecting the relative importance of
targets (substitution rates), are to be adjusted later. The resulting objective
function is quadratic because of the quadratic third target (variance or regional
unemployment rates).
• Optimization model
The optimization problem is linear-quadratic, with a quadratic objective func-
tion minimized subject to a linear budget constraint and eligibility restrictions.
It is solved with a MATLAB computer program.
3. User interface to analyze optimal solutions and interactive feedback-
based adjustments
The optimization is performed for West Germany and East Germany with sepa-
rate budgets, as well as for the whole of Germany with a joint budget. Tabular
and graphical output enables to adjust target weights interactively with respect to
attainable outcomes, as well as with respect to tax returns from the jobs subsidized.
Chapter 2, “Model”, contains rigorous assumptions and mathematical propositions,
as well as the description of the model design. The ‘motor’ is Theil’s (1971, p. 12) vec-
tor/matrix representation of the variance which separates linear and quadratic operations,
and thereby makes the optimization problem solvable.
Chapter 3, “Analysis of the past practice”, contains the comparison of the results
actually obtained in 2000–2002 with the ones which could be obtained if the optimization
model were used. It is shown that the same control indicators could be obtained with
only 4% of the actual budget (241 Mio. EUR instead of 6 Bio. EUR), meaning that the
efficiency of optimal planning is 25 times higher.
Chapter 4, “Managing regional policy”, explains how to interactively adjust target
weights to the end of implementing intentions of the policy maker. The tabular and
graphical interface to the model is based on the triangle of priorities ‘Employment—
GDP—Equalization of regions’. It allows to trace the output implications from positioning
within the triangle and to predict tax returns from new or safeguarded jobs.
The last chapter “Conclusion” outlines perspectives for further developments and re-
capitulates the main results of the paper.
2 Model
Empirical data 1994–2002 and variables derived Table 1 provides a sample of
source data and of their transformation into the model variables. In the interest of saving
space, only the first 10 records of the year 1994 are displayed in Table 1, but the data were
compiled for all 271 regions for the years 1994–2001. Blank spaces mean that the region
received no aid on the given year, like Heide, Hamburg, Braunschweig, and Salzgitter.
The productivity (= GDP per employee) reflects the competitive standing of the region.
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Table 1: Sample source data 1994 and their transformation into regional variables
Nr.Region Source data Variables (data derivatives)
Em-
ployed
Unem-
ployed
GDP Aid to
the
region
Number
of
perma-
nent jobs
subsi-
dized
Net
em-
ployed
(as if
with no
aid)
Net
unem-
ployed
(as if
with no
aid)
Produc-
tivity
(GDP/
Num.of
empl.)
Aid per
job sub-
sidized
Ths ThsMio.EURMio.EUR Ths. Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR
1Husum 75.30 4.00 2895 0.560 0.030 75.27 4.03 38.4 18.67
2Heide 54.70 4.00 2308 54.70 4.00 42.2
3 Itzehoe 53.50 4.30 2791 0.800 0.130 53.37 4.43 52.2 6.15
4Flensburg 128.90 10.60 5411 11.350 0.234 128.67 10.83 42.0 48.50
5 Lu¨beck 197.80 16.70 8277 0.030 0.003 197.80 16.70 41.8 10.00
6Kiel 336.10 29.40 15111 0.220 0.039 336.06 29.44 45.0 5.64
7Ratzeburg 56.80 4.80 2514 0.570 0.165 56.63 4.96 44.3 3.45
8Hamburg 1388.40 97.20 79859 1388.40 97.20 57.5
9Braunschweig 220.50 23.90 10283 220.50 23.90 46.6
10 Salzgitter 57.90 7.60 2901 57.90 7.60 50.1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The four variables are derived from the source data as follows:
Net employed = Number of employed
−Number of permanent jobs subsidized (in Ths)
Net unemployed = Number of unemployed
+Number of permanent jobs subsidized (in Ths)
Productivity =
GDP
Number of employed
(in Ths EUR/employee)
Aid per job subsidized =
Aid to the region
Number of permanent jobs subsidized
(in Ths EUR/job)
The number of net employed and of net unemployed are computed assuming no ex-
ternal interventions such as the creation of new and/or safeguarding existing jobs.
The productivity reflects the competitive standing of the region. Supporting produc-
tive regions implies developing industries and services with an important contribution to
GDP.
The aid per job is in fact the price of one job for grant givers. Subsidizing the regions
where this price is low implies a high effect of the grant, because more jobs can be
subsidized for the same aid. On the other hand, ‘cheap’ jobs, requiring little investments,
are suspected of belonging to low productive branches with simple working equipment.
Our study however disproves this hypothesis.
Econometric forecast for 2004 For each of the 271 regions, the four model variables
are time series for 1994–2001. The next step is to predict their 271× 4 = 1084 values for
the year 2004. It is done by common linear regression techniques. The prediction is made
whenever the data on the region are available (also for the West German regions which
received aid irregularly, but not for those which received no aid at all).
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In certain cases, predictions for 2004 are unrealistic, being too high or too low, or
even negative. For instance, the expenditures per subsidized job in Dresden in 2004 are
estimated as −7.72 Ths EUR. This estimate is caused by irregular leaps of Dresden’s
variable ”Aid per job” in 1994–2001, implying a steeply decreasing regression line which
after the gap 2002–2003 goes into the negative domain. Such unrealistic predictions are
corrected using the technique of constrained forecast which limits the predicted values
to the range of the preceding observations. The second section of Table 2 contains con-
strained forecast for three variables from the first section, and, additionally, the regional
net unemployment rates derived from constrained predictions of net employed and net
unemployed. Thus the negative ”Aid per job in 2004” in Dresden is replaced by +7.81 Ths
EUR which is the minimal value during 1994–2001. The forecast for the regional variables
”Productivity” is not constrained, because the development of the regional productivity
is quite sustainable and is quasi-linear in all the regions.
The third section of Table 2 contains further derivatives from the constrained forecast
2004 which characterize the efficiency of 1 Mio. EUR aid to the region in 2004 (the 271-
vectors with predicted regional figures used further by the model are denoted by boldface
letters):
u = net unemployed 2004, in Ths.
n = net unemployment rate 2004 = Net unemployed 2004Net employed 2004 + Net unemployed 2004 ·100%,
j = 1/Aid per job 2004, in Ths, the additional jobs in the region which can be subsidized
in 2004 for 1 Mio EUR.
g = Productivity 2004.∗j, in Mio EUR, the GDP gain in 2004 due to the additional jobs
subsidized for 1 Mio. EUR under the expected regional productivity; .∗ denotes the
element-by-element product of two vectors, e.g. (1, 2). ∗ (3, 4) = (3, 8).
d = j./(Net employed 2004 + Net unemployed 2004) · 100%, the decrement in regional
unemployment rate 2004 due to the additional jobs subsidized for 1 Mio. EUR; ./ de-
notes the element-by-element division of two vectors, e.g. (1, 2)./(3, 4) = (1/3, 2/4).
Target variables Introduce the following notation.
x the (unknown) 271-vector of subsidies to the regions in 2004, in Mio EUR,
t1(x) = j
′x the first target index, the total additional number of jobs in 2004 due to the
subsidies x; here ′ denotes the operation of vector/matrix transpose, and j ′x is the
scalar product of two vectors,
t2(x) = g
′x the second target index, the total increment in the national GDP 2004, in
Mio EUR, due to the jobs created for regional subsidies x,
n−Dx the 271-vector of regional unemployment rates, in %, attainable in 2004 due
to subsidies x; here n is the predicted net unemployment and D = diagd is the
diagonal matrix with elements of vector d on its main diagonal (decrements in
regional unemployment rates due to 1 Mio. EUR aid).
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Table 2: 2004-forecast for East German regions and optimal aid distribution
Nr.Region Econometric forecast 2004 Constrained forecast 2004 Efficiency of 1 Mio.EUR aid Separate budgets of East and West
Net
em-
ployed
(no
aid)
Net
unem-
ployed
(no
aid)
Produc-
tivity
Aid
pro
job
Net
em-
ployed
(no
aid)
u
Net
unem-
ployed
(no
aid)
n
Net
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Aid
pro
job
j
Addi-
tional
jobs
g
GDP
gain
d
Decre-
ment
in
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
x1:0:0
Aid
distri-
bution
w.r.t.
em-
ployment
x0:1:0
Aid
distri-
bution
w.r.t.
GDP
x0:0:1
Aid
distri-
bution
w.r.t.
equa-
lization
x2:1:7
Aid
distri-
bution
with
Target
ratio
2:1:7
Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
205Pasewalk 30.92 11.75 38.9 16.94 31.84 10.77 25.28 16.94 0.059 2.3 0.14 37.68 37.71
206Greifswald 68.71 19.68 38.4 15.37 68.71 17.75 20.53 19.79 0.051 1.9 0.06
207Stralsund 72.14 21.56 38.4 5.70 72.14 19.56 21.33 20.14 0.050 1.9 0.05 7.00
208Bergen 30.07 8.28 36.1 37.76 30.07 7.73 20.45 37.76 0.026 1.0 0.07
209Neubrandenburg 109.74 35.43 41.2 20.82 109.74 30.82 21.93 20.82 0.048 2.0 0.03 3.60
210Waren 27.04 9.47 40.3 3.00 27.04 8.13 23.10 6.55 0.153 6.1 0.43 53.24 53.24 7.92 11.87
211Gu¨strow 40.05 14.13 47.7 13.32 40.44 12.45 23.54 13.32 0.075 3.6 0.14 24.62 31.38
212Rostock 140.59 31.45 50.2 13.55 145.21 31.44 17.80 13.55 0.074 3.7 0.04
213Wismar 57.58 17.20 43.9 20.28 57.58 16.40 22.17 20.28 0.049 2.2 0.07 22.43 3.49
214Schwerin 105.09 22.11 44.1 2.17 109.52 20.05 15.47 8.79 0.114 5.0 0.09
215Parchim 38.40 11.62 41.8 −2.18 38.40 10.24 21.05 4.83 0.207 8.7 0.43 49.42 49.42 3.23 9.29
216Berlin 1866.89 410.67 49.1 12.661882.46 355.28 15.88 12.66 0.079 3.9 0.00 348.92
217Brandenburg a.d. Havel 51.48 17.05 42.1 35.88 52.96 16.13 23.35 35.88 0.028 1.2 0.04 47.00
218Belzig 33.02 6.55 42.5 −11.35 31.43 5.53 14.96 6.10 0.164 7.0 0.44 33.73 33.73
219Cottbus 145.30 38.21 48.9 19.40 146.80 32.65 18.20 19.40 0.052 2.5 0.03
220Eberswalde 29.47 9.13 42.4 8.71 29.47 7.79 20.89 10.58 0.095 4.0 0.25 4.33 8.94
221Prenzlau 54.07 20.72 49.9 54.49 54.95 19.14 25.83 54.49 0.018 0.9 0.02 127.00
222Finsterwalde 44.48 18.18 42.9 6.44 44.48 15.46 25.80 7.84 0.128 5.5 0.21 121.21 27.90 38.74
223Frankfurt/Oder 141.05 35.67 45.4 8.96 141.05 32.27 18.62 8.96 0.112 5.1 0.06 46.03
224Luckenwalde 31.27 8.76 56.8 9.68 30.19 7.50 19.90 9.68 0.103 5.9 0.27 72.64 0.46 6.33
225Neuruppin 64.02 18.69 43.3 17.97 62.49 16.55 20.94 17.97 0.056 2.4 0.07 4.73
226Perleberg 31.67 11.39 43.9 9.63 34.36 11.15 24.51 9.74 0.103 4.5 0.23 20.72 27.46
227Senftenberg 43.28 22.20 41.2 40.89 50.27 19.19 27.63 40.89 0.024 1.0 0.04 167.31
228Salzwedel 35.02 10.05 45.0 36.56 35.38 9.71 21.54 36.56 0.027 1.2 0.06 12.39
229Stendal 48.20 17.07 44.8 32.53 50.90 16.11 24.04 32.53 0.031 1.4 0.05 61.70
230Burg 40.08 12.30 43.7 16.12 40.08 10.91 21.39 16.12 0.062 2.7 0.12 10.32 12.06
231Magdeburg 198.84 48.89 44.9 39.69 198.84 48.89 19.73 39.69 0.025 1.1 0.01
232Halberstadt 92.84 31.52 44.1 36.89 93.78 29.75 24.08 36.89 0.027 1.2 0.02 44.93
233Staßfurt 33.04 14.79 49.6 17.38 35.32 13.69 27.93 17.38 0.058 2.9 0.12 66.17 67.09
234Scho¨nebeck 46.58 17.80 45.1 46.44 48.96 17.80 26.66 46.44 0.022 1.0 0.03 146.15
235Dessau 87.81 28.68 42.8 17.88 88.02 27.44 23.77 17.88 0.056 2.4 0.05 54.63 31.75
236Wittenberg 43.00 16.17 44.3 28.09 45.62 14.71 24.38 28.09 0.036 1.6 0.06 60.21 9.70
237Sangerhausen 54.96 22.92 43.4 28.99 57.30 20.96 26.78 28.99 0.034 1.5 0.04 124.77 25.77
238Halle 152.41 42.44 42.2 25.21 158.97 35.35 18.19 25.21 0.040 1.7 0.02
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Table 2: 2004-forecast for East German regions and optimal aid distribution (continued)
Nr.Region Econometric forecast 2004 Constrained forecast 2004 Efficiency of 1 Mio.EUR aid Separate budgets of East and West
Net
em-
ployed
(no
aid)
Net
unem-
ployed
(no
aid)
Produc-
tivity
Aid
pro
job
Net
em-
ployed
(no
aid)
u
Net
unem-
ployed
(no
aid)
n
Net
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Aid
pro
job
j
Addi-
tional
jobs
g
GDP
gain
d
Decre-
ment
in
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
x1:0:0
Aid
distri-
bution
w.r.t.
em-
ployment
x0:1:0
Aid
distri-
bution
w.r.t.
GDP
x0:0:1
Aid
distri-
bution
w.r.t.
equa-
lization
x2:1:7
Aid
distri-
bution
with
Target
ratio
2:1:7
Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
239Bitterfeld 28.26 16.88 51.5 71.61 37.17 15.24 29.08 71.61 0.014 0.7 0.03 248.46
240Naumburg 133.04 48.52 49.1 22.43 135.90 42.14 23.67 22.43 0.045 2.2 0.03 40.75
241Erfurt 165.04 29.76 41.7 12.64 165.04 28.51 14.73 12.64 0.079 3.3 0.04
242Weimar 67.29 14.45 35.9 −1.33 66.67 13.40 16.74 6.75 0.148 5.3 0.18 90.52 90.52
243Gera 99.35 24.55 39.8 10.72 101.12 24.55 19.53 10.72 0.093 3.7 0.07 19.74
244Jena 98.74 15.99 44.5 19.53 95.59 15.99 14.33 19.53 0.051 2.3 0.05
245Suhl 50.58 12.13 40.5 5.56 50.58 12.13 19.34 6.04 0.166 6.7 0.26 73.24 73.24 8.94
246Eichsfeld 44.09 9.80 36.3 9.75 41.63 9.80 19.06 9.75 0.103 3.7 0.20 3.12
247Nordhausen 37.67 10.65 43.5 4.82 38.38 10.65 21.72 4.98 0.201 8.7 0.41 53.01 53.01 4.98 11.34
248Eisenach 78.76 16.71 37.2 4.98 78.76 16.71 17.51 7.63 0.131 4.9 0.14 127.45 4.50
249Mu¨hlhausen 49.48 10.40 37.0 4.46 49.17 10.40 17.46 4.82 0.207 7.7 0.35 50.17 50.17 1.86
250Sondershausen 32.54 12.28 39.9 8.01 32.54 12.28 27.40 8.01 0.125 5.0 0.28 27.39 33.67
251Meiningen 62.84 13.89 38.8 7.39 61.46 13.89 18.44 7.46 0.134 5.2 0.18 103.58 53.08 6.95
252Gotha 64.94 13.18 42.8 6.16 63.68 13.18 17.15 8.37 0.120 5.1 0.16
253Arnstadt 46.77 13.09 38.5 9.97 45.78 13.09 22.24 9.97 0.100 3.9 0.17 13.42 22.76
254Sonneberg 27.24 4.66 37.6 9.57 26.35 4.66 15.03 9.57 0.104 3.9 0.34
255Saalfeld 49.26 12.68 43.0 0.15 50.28 12.68 20.14 5.40 0.185 8.0 0.29 68.53 68.53 1.31 11.75
256Po¨ 41.55 10.37 41.2 −0.19 41.55 10.25 19.80 4.99 0.201 8.3 0.39 51.14 51.14 0.27 7.15
257Altenburg 39.58 14.67 39.7 8.38 39.58 13.58 25.55 8.38 0.119 4.7 0.22 25.43 33.84
258Leipzig 365.37 88.34 40.9 18.60 365.37 76.27 17.27 18.60 0.054 2.2 0.01
259Torgau/Oschatz 68.64 21.67 40.6 6.18 68.64 19.91 22.49 7.99 0.125 5.1 0.14 17.27 38.45
260Grimma 50.95 15.69 41.8 7.67 50.12 12.88 20.44 8.27 0.121 5.1 0.19 2.83 14.52
261Freiberg 87.50 29.38 38.1 8.58 89.04 26.64 23.03 9.40 0.106 4.1 0.09 29.21 60.67
262Chemnitz 236.48 61.16 41.9 4.87 246.40 56.67 18.70 6.54 0.153 6.4 0.05 370.64 370.64 173.93
263Annaberg 116.22 38.16 36.4 7.71 116.22 35.15 23.22 8.77 0.114 4.1 0.08 35.65 87.51
264Zwickau 108.17 29.15 44.4 12.39 107.92 26.56 19.75 12.39 0.081 3.6 0.06 14.97
265Plauen 109.04 28.66 39.2 7.81 109.04 26.34 19.46 7.81 0.128 5.0 0.09 15.90 36.44
266Dresden 341.10 63.01 43.8 −7.72 341.10 55.52 14.00 6.31 0.158 6.9 0.04 350.35 350.35 193.12
267Riesa 48.68 14.48 43.3 22.62 48.68 14.17 22.54 22.62 0.044 1.9 0.07 27.47 3.93
268Pirna 104.90 31.20 34.1 1.97 104.90 26.93 20.43 6.03 0.166 5.7 0.13 162.45 162.45 2.47 41.39
269Bautzen 147.62 47.54 40.1 12.75 147.62 40.67 21.60 12.75 0.078 3.1 0.04 5.13 48.77
270Go¨rlitz 62.88 22.16 34.8 17.06 62.88 19.91 24.05 17.06 0.059 2.0 0.07 48.68 38.82
271Lo¨bau-Zittau 58.53 19.34 34.3 18.72 58.53 17.58 23.10 18.72 0.053 1.8 0.07 35.44 18.73
West Germany 32045.702531.20 59.2 31490.372520.09 7.41 282.66 282.66 282.66 282.66
East Germany 7212.181897.13 44.0 7282.401717.64 19.08 1653.38 1653.38 1653.38 1653.38
Whole Germany39257.884428.32 56.4 38772.774237.73 9.85 1936.04 1936.04 1936.04 1936.04
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t3(x) = V(n−Dx) =
1
m−1
(
x′DV Dx− 2n′V Dx + n′V n
)
, in %2, the third target in-
dex, the variance of m regional unemployment rates attainable in 2004 due to sub-
sidies x which characterizes the disparity among regions. The expression for this
target index follows from the two propositions below.
Theorem 1 (Variance operator, Theil 1971, p. 12)
Consider a vector of m observations y = (y1, . . . , ym). Then their variance
1
m− 1
m∑
r=1
(
yr −
1
m
m∑
s=1
ys
)2
=
1
m− 1
‖V y‖2 , (1)
where the variance operator V is the (m×m)-matrix
V =


1− 1
m
− 1
m
. . . − 1
m
− 1
m
− 1
m
1− 1
m
. . . − 1
m
− 1
m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
− 1
m
− 1
m
. . . − 1
m
1− 1
m

 =


1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 1

− 1m .
The variance matrix is symmetric and idempotent, that is,
V ′ = V
V V = V .
Theorem 2 (Unemployment disparity among regions)
The variance of m regional unemployment rates attained due to subsidies x is
V(n−Dx) =
1
m− 1
(
x′DV Dx− 2n′V Dx + n′V n
)
. (2)
Proof. Substitute y = n−Dx into (1) and obtain:
V(n−Dx) =
1
m− 1
‖V (n−Dx)‖2
=
1
m− 1
(V n− V Dx)′(V n− V Dx)
(AB)′=B′A′, V ′=V
=⇒
=
1
m− 1
(n′V − x′DV )(V n− V Dx)
V V =V
=⇒
=
1
m− 1
(
n′V n− x′DV n− n′V Dx + x′DV Dx
)
(AB)′=B′A′
=⇒
=
1
m− 1
(
x′DV Dx− 2n′V Dx + n′V n
)
.
Optimal regional policy As mentioned in the Introduction, the subsidies are aimed
at reducing regional disparities. Since an increase in total employment and GDP are also
desired, we obtain the following proposition.
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Theorem 3 (Optimization of regional policy)
Given total budget B, list of the regions eligible to receive subsidies, and importance ratio
of three target variables a : b : c, then the optimal aid distribution x = {xr} is the solution
to the problem
maximize at1(x) + bt2(x)− ct3(x) (3)
subject to
∑
r
xr ≤ B (budget constraint)
0 ≤ Jx ≤ u (fewer jobs than unemployed in the region)
xr = 0 for non-eligible regions r ,
where J = diagj is the diagonal matrix with elements of vector j on its main diagonal.
Taking into account the expressions for targets ti(x), we obtain a quadratic programming
problem with the objective function
at1(x) + bt2(x)− ct3(x) = −x
′
(
c
m− 1
DV D
)
x +
(
2cn′V D + aj + bg
)′
x (4)
which Hessian DV D is symmetric implying the problem solvability. (The constant −cn′V n
plays no role in the maximization and is omitted in the objective function.)
Notes on the model assumptions One of the critical points of the model is that one
cannot subsidize one region without affecting neighboring regions. The regional responses
to the aid are cross-correlated, which is ignored in our simplified linear model. Time
factors like those considered by Griffith (1996) and Elhorst (2001) are also not taken into
account. These and similar properties could be implemented if we dealt exclusively with
a prediction model. The situation is complicated by the optimization which operates on
the response equations (not fixed predictions!).
1. Non-computability of a non-linear model model
If the linear model of regional response to subsidies n−Dx in the variance operator
(2) is replaced by a non-linear model, then the quadratic objective function (4) is no
longer quadratic. For instance, if cross-correlations between regions are considered
then the response model becomes quadratic, and the objective function (4) has the
fourth polynomial degree. If, instead of a linear forecast, non-linear time factors are
considered, then, again, the degree of the objective function increases.
Since there are no available computational methods to solve such problems, the
alternatives are: an accurate non-computable model or an inaccurate computable
model.
2. Linearity as the first-order approximation
On the other hand, the assumption of the linear regional response to subsidies, both
spatial and temporal as in our case, can be regarded as the first-order approximation
of the unknown response function. This general interpretation follows from the
Taylor expansion of a function up to the first term: It is the first-order approximation
of the function, and it is linear in the argument increment.
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In particular, it implies that the error increases as the model variables deviate
from the initial values. Therefore, ‘moderate’ solutions with a strong impact of
the equalization target are more accurate than ‘extreme’ solutions which neglect
the equalization. It is an additional argument for the controllability of an economy
with a well-equalized regional unemployment.
If necessary the model (3) can be easily upgraded with additional constraints, like
the bottom unemployment limit 2% instead of 0% and specific restrictions for particular
regions, or with weights to favor priority regions.
Normalizing targets and their weights The weights a, b, c reflect no relative impor-
tance of targets because of their different range:
t1 (Additional jobs): 50–500 Ths,
t2 (GDP gain): 6–17 Bio EUR, and
t3 (Variance of regional unemployment): 3–40%
2.
For instance, equal target weights a = b = c imply no equal priorities but the absolute
predominance of target t2 and neglect of targets t1 and t3. Therefore, we normalize the
target variables t = t1, t2, t3 by reducing their ranges to 0–1:
tnormal =
t− tmin
tmax − tmin
t = tnormal
(
tmax − tmin
)
+ tmin
The target limits are obtained from solving three one-target problems (with all the weights
but one equal to 0). For instance, putting a = b = 0, c = 1 we obtain the problem for
equalizing regional unemployment rates regardless of the other two target variables. Since
all the resources are channelled to attaining this goal, one attains the maximum possible
value t3 max.
From now on we refer to normalized weights of target variables. For instance, it is the
case of weight ratios 2 : 1 : 7 in Table 2.
3 Analysis of the past practice
Recall that the grant discussed is given primarily to equalize the regional unemployment
rates. The budgets of West and East parts are separate, meaning that there are in fact
two equalization programs. What was done actually and what could be done with the
optimization model?
Better results for the same budget To be specific, consider East Germany in 2000–
2002. During this three-year period it received both national and European subsidies for
equalization of regional unemployment rates. Apply model (3) to East German regions
205–271. Put target weights a = b = 0, c = 1, meaning that the attention is restricted
to the goal of the grant, equalization of regional unemployment, ignoring side goals. The
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Table 3: Efficiency of the actual equalization programs in 2000–2002
Actual state 2002 Optimal equalization Budget optimization Efficiency
Average
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Vari-
ance
Actual
budget
Average
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Vari-
ance
Average
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Vari-
ance
Suffici-
ent
budget
Suffi-
cient-
to-
actual
budget
ratio
% %2 Bio.EUR % %2 % %2 Bio.EUR %
West Germany 7.45 4.40 0.62 7.28 3.50 7.48 4.40 0.24 39.1
East Germany 18.21 9.76 5.36 18.21 0.28 22.93 9.17 0.00 0.0
Whole of Germany 10.11 27.29 5.98 9.49 17.32 10.25 27.29 3.01 51.8
total budget is B = 5.36 Bio.EUR. The last constraint in (3) is omitted, because all East
German regions are eligible to receive the aid.
The top two graphs in Figure 1 displays the actual situation in East Germany in
2000 and in 2002 after the three-year equalization program has been implemented. The
horizontal axis shows the East German regions numbered from 205 to 271. The vertical
axis shows the regional unemployment rate in %. The (unweighted) average regional
unemployment rate for East Germany is traced by the horizontal line. The variance of
regional unemployment is illustrated by deviations from the mean.
In three years, neither the average regional unemployment rate, nor the variance are
reduced. On the contrary, both indices grow (the average 17.68 ↗ 18.21%, and the
variance 8.91 ↗ 9.76%2). This outcome is due to two factors, unfavorable economic
development and bad management of the equalization program. To separate the effects,
consider the third graph in Figure 1 with the situation in 2002 if no jobs were subsidized
(= net regional unemployment rates). Naturally, the average unemployment is higher
because of fewer jobs. However, the variance of net regional rates, as if with no subsidies,
is smaller than with the subsidies. It means that the equalization program makes more
harm than good and aggravates the economic development by investing money in wrong
regions.
The bottom graph in Figure 1 shows which equalization could be attained in East
Germany for the same budget. Instead of 8.91↗ 9.76%2, the variance can be drastically
reduced to ↘ 0.28%2, meaning an almost perfect equalization of regional unemployment
rates. It does not even affect the average unemployment, retaining it at the same 18.21%.
This effect is only due to channelling money to the right regions in the right proportion.
The actual and optimal figures, in particular for East Germany, are collected in the
first two sections of Table 3. The goal of the subsidies, the equalization, is shown by the
normal font; the auxiliary average unemployment is shown by a small font.
What is wrong with the actual budget distribution? For instance, consider Berlin
(the region No. 216). Its net unemployment rate (with no subsidies) 18.7% is almost
equal to the East German average 18.21%, meaning no urgency in subsidies. Nevertheless
Berlin gets the most, 536.7 Mio. EUR, which brings its unemployment rate down to
16.6%. Thereby the initial deviation from the average 0.49% is tripled and becomes 1.61%.
Besides, due to a large population, reducing Berlin’s unemployment by one percent is
much more costly for grant-givers than that in small regions. It means that half Bio.EUR
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(a)  Unemployment 2000:  Average=17.68,  Variance=8.91
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(b)   Actual unemployment 2002:  Average=18.21,  Variance=9.76
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(c)  Net unemployment 2002 (with no aid): Average=22.93,  Variance=9.17
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(d)  Equalized unemployment 2002: Average=18.21,  Variance=0.28
Figure 1: Equalization of unemployment in East Germany (regions 205–271)
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(a)  Unemployment 2000:  Average=9.82,  Variance=26.42
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(b)   Actual unemployment 2002:  Average=10.11,  Variance=27.29
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(c)  Net unemployment 2002 (with no aid): Average=11.54,  Variance=50.08
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(d)  Equalized unemployment 2002: Average=9.49,  Variance=17.32
Figure 2: Equalization of unemployment in the whole of Germany (regions 1–271)
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unnecessarily and irrationally spent for Berlin could be used for other regions with much
greater urgency and with much higher efficiency.
Such planning errors are typical for large towns. For example, Dresden, Magdeburg,
Jena, Wismar, Schwerin, Rostock receive two-three times more subsidies than necessary
but other regions are strong undersubsidized, e.g., Naumburg by 277 Mio.EUR, Stendal
by 179 Mio.EUR, Bitterfeld by 118 Mio.EUR, etc.
The situation in West Germany is similar, although less salient. The West German
budget is eight times lower, and the number of regions is three times higher than in
East Germany. Besides, not all West German regions are eligible to receive the aid. The
additional constraints reduce the feasible domain for optimization, making it less effective.
In case of West Germany, model (3) is applied to regions 1–204. The target weights
a = b = 0, c = 1, and the budget B = 617.8 Mio.EUR. The last constraint in (3) is not
omitted. For exact results of optimization see Table 3.
Better results due to a joint East-West budget As general in optimization, the
fewer constraints, the larger the feasible domain and the larger the range of attainable
values of the objective function. In our case, considering a joint budget of both East and
West Germany allows to obtain better equalization results under the same total budget.
Therefore, model (3) is applied to regions 1–271 with target weights a = b = 0, c = 1
and the joint budget B = 5.98 Bio.EUR. The last constraint in (3) is as in the model
for West Germany, since all East German regions are eligible. The optimization results
are displayed in Figure 2 with the same design as Figure1. In spite of 5.98 Bio.EUR
subsidies during 2000–2002 both indices of regional unemployment increased: the average
all-Germany rate 9.82↗ 10.11%, and the all-German variance 26.42↗ 27.29%2. At the
same time, a joint budget would reduce both indicators: 9.82 ↘ 9.49% for the average
rate, and 26.42↘ 17.32%2 for the variance.
For comparing actual and optimal results see the last row in the first two sections of
Table 3.
Equal results for a lower budget (budget optimization) The efficiency of a deci-
sion is the fraction of its budget which is sufficient to attain the same results. Say, if the
actual equalization of unemployment could be attained with 20% of the actual budget,
then the efficiency of the actual program is 20%.
The third section of Table 3 displays which budget suffices to attain the actual equal-
ization. To find the minimal sufficient budget, model (3) is applied to progressively lower
budget unless the optimized variance is equal to the actual variance in 2002.
As seen from Table 3 for West Germany, 0.24 Bio.EUR of actual 0.62 Bio.EUR suffices
to attain the actual variance 4.40%2, meaning the 39%-efficiency of the actual equalization
program displayed in the right-hand column of Table 3.
The equalization program in East Germany only increased the disparity among regions.
No subsidy would imply a lower variance than the actual one, meaning the 0%-efficiency
of the actual equalization program.
Thus, the equalization in East and West Germany actually made for 5.98 Bio.EUR
could be attained for only 0.24 Bio.EUR, meaning the total 4%-efficiency of both
programs together.
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From the viewpoint of the hypothetical joint East-West budget the situation is some-
what different. The efficiency of the actual program is almost 52%. Note that the total
efficiency is much higher than that of each contributing program. It is explained as follows.
The all-German average regional unemployment rate in 2002 is 10.11% which is much
lower than the East German average 18.21%. The subsidies to East German regions
are often superfluous and miss to bring the regional unemployment rates to the East
German average but nevertheless reduce their distance to the much lower all-German
level. Therefore, from the all-German viewpoint, the grant to East Germany is not used
that irrationally as it looks from the East German viewpoint.
Summary of the analysis of the past practice The implementation of actual gov-
ernmental programs for equalizing regional unemployment rates is far from being optimal,
both in East and West Germany. There are at least three directions for improvements:
1. Optimizing the equalization program for the given budget.
2. Optimizing the shares of West and East Germany in the total budget.
3. Optimizing the program for a fraction of the initial budget and releasing some
resources for side goals like reducing the national unemployment and/or subsidizing
competitive industries.
4 Managing regional policy
The three directions for improvements are previewed in model (3) by allowing variable
number of regions, variable target weights and variable budget. Let us describe how to
design the regional policy for 2004.
One-target and three-target optimization The fourth section of Table 2, ‘Separate
budgets of East and West’ contains four East German optimal budget allocations found
by model (3) for three one-target and one combined policy. Figure 3 displays the effects
of four optimal policies both for West Germany, whose regions 1–204 are depicted in blue,
and for East Germany, whose regions 205–271 are depicted in red, under the assumption
that they have separate budgets.
To be specific, consider East Germany (depicted in red). Its budget B = 1653.38 Mio
EUR for 2004 is predicted from years 1994–2001, when it gradually decreased. All the
m = 67 East German regions numbered 205–271 were eligible to receive the aid, which
we accept for the year 2004 in (3).
The predicted net regional unemployment rates (with no aid) are shown in plots
of Figure 3 by the stair contour. The colored bars show the unemployment rates
reduced due to the optimal aid received. The residual white gaps between the stair
contour and colored bars depict the proper effect of the aid. Let us comment on each
policy in some detail.
• Employment-only policy, or maximization of additional jobs, the target weight
ratio 1 : 0 : 0.
The model exhausts the unemployment in the 15 of 67 regions with the most ‘cheap’
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Effect of Model with one target Minimal Unemployment for 2004
West Germany: Unempl.7.4% →7.0%    GDP ↑6.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.7.0%2 →8.5%2
East Germany:  Unempl.19.1% →16.1%    GDP ↑10.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.12.9%2 →89.5%2
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Effect of Model with one target Maximal GDP Gain for 2004
West Germany: Unempl.7.4% →7.0%    GDP ↑6.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.7.0%2 →8.2%2
East Germany:  Unempl.19.1% →16.2%    GDP ↑10.9 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.12.9%2 →89.3%2
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Effect of Model with one target Best Unemployment Equalization (Least Variance) for 2004
West Germany: Unempl.7.4% →7.3%    GDP ↑2.8 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.7.0%2 →4.5%2
East Germany:  Unempl.19.1% →18.3%    GDP ↑3.1 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.12.9%2 →4.2%2
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Effect of Model with Target ratio 2:1:7 for 2004
West Germany: Unempl.7.4% →7.1%    GDP ↑4.5 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.7.0%2 →4.8%2
East Germany:  Unempl.19.1% →17.1%    GDP ↑7.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.12.9%2 →14.7%2
Figure 3: Effects of aid distribution with a separate budget for West and East Germany
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Effect of Model with one target Minimal Unemployment for 2004
Whole Germany: Unempl.9.9% →8.8%    GDP ↑20.8 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.41.7%2 →50.0%2
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Effect of Model with one target Maximal GDP Gain for 2004
Whole Germany: Unempl.9.9% →8.8%    GDP ↑21.0 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.41.7%2 →50.6%2
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Effect of Model with one target Best Unemployment Equalization (Least Variance) for 2004
Whole Germany: Unempl.9.9% →9.4%    GDP ↑7.6 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.41.7%2 →25.3%2
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Effect of Model with Target ratio 2:1:7 for 2004
Whole Germany: Unempl.9.9% →9.1%    GDP ↑13.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.41.7%2 →28.0%2
Figure 4: Effects of aid distribution with a joint budget for West and East Germany
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jobs, including, among others, Wiemar, Eisenach, Chemniz, and Dresden. The last
subsidized region is 265 (Plauen) where the aid efficiency is as low as 134 jobs for 1
Mio EUR aid. Here, the almost exhausted aid suffices to subsidize only a few jobs,
resulting in a small white gap in the upper plot.
This policy reduces the predicted average unemployment by 3%, increases the pre-
dicted GDP by almost 11 Bio EUR, but compared to the predicted net value,
increases the unemployment variance 12.9↗ 90%2.
• GDP-maximization-only policy, or competitiveness-supporting policy, the tar-
get weight ratio 0 : 1 : 0.
The model also selects 15 of 67 regions, but now with the best productivity-to-‘job-
price’ ratio. The last subsidized region is 251 (Meiningen) with the aid efficiency as
low as 5.2 Mio EUR of GDP gain from 1 Mio EUR aid (520%-returns).
Compared to the previous case, the policy results in a little higher GDP gain (by
only 135 Mio EUR) and a little higher average unemployment (by 0.1%). The
unemployment variance is almost the same, being 0.2%2 lower. 13 of the 15 regions
selected coincide in both policies.
This means that productive regions are ‘cheap’ for grant-givers. Highly
competitive industries can create new jobs with little aid.
• Equalization-only policy, or least variance of regional unemployment rates,
the target weight ratio 0 : 0 : 1.
The model selects 41 of 67 regions with a high net unemployment (vector n) which
reduction is still affordable (vector d). The effect of the policy can be well seen in
the third plot of Figure 3.
The available aid significantly reduces the unemployment variance 12.9 ↘ 4.2%2,
but the average unemployment decreases by only 0.8% and the increment in GDP
is as low as 3.1 Bio.EUR (188%-return from the aid).
• Combined three-target policy, with the target weight ratio 2 : 1 : 7.
The effect of this policy is shown in the bottom plot of Figure 3. Compared to the
equalization-only policy, it suggests 2.5 times higher increment in GDP (7.7 instead
of 3.1 Bio.EUR) and 2.5 times greater decrement in the national unemployment (2.0
instead of 0.8%). However, compared to the predicted net value, the disparity among
regions somewhat increases (12.9 ↗ 14.7%2 instead of 12.9 ↘ 4.2%2), although it
is far from 90%2 as under the employment-only and competitiveness-only policies.
An increase in the regional disparity does not meet the main destination of the aid.
Adjusting the target weight ratio, for instance, to 2:0.5:7.5 (not illustrated by a plot),
we obtain the (optimized) policy with the unemployment variance 12.9 ↘ 11.7%2.
If necessary, the equalization can be more emphasized by giving more weight to the
third target.
The cases of West Germany (shown by blue in Figure 3), as well as of the whole of
Germany with a joint budget (shown by green in Figure 4) are analogous. The main
numeric specifications of the alternative policies can be found in captions to plots, and
we do not comment on them here.
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Triangle of priorities and target maps The target weight ratio a : b : c in model (3)
says little to a policy maker. In fact, the only points of interest are the attainable com-
binations of national unemployment, GDP gain, and variance of regional unemployment
rates. The one-to-one correspondence between target weight ratios and optimal solutions
can be used to build a simple user interface to the model. Instead of operating on weight
ratios, the policy maker can make choices directly from triplets of optimized target indices.
This idea is implemented in the triangle of priorities in Table 4 which displays the
triplets of indices optimized for target weights in 0.1 steps. For this purpose, the target
weights a, b, c ≥ 0 are normalized to a+ b+ c = 1 which determine the triangular form of
the table. For instance, the cell with target weights 0.2 : 0.1 : 0.7 lies at the intersection
of the column indexed 0.1 and row indexed 0.7. The cells with weights of the first target
0.2 lie at the diagonal indicated by an arrow stemming from 0.2 in the foot row of the
table.
Consider the head element in the table cells, the national unemployment, as the height
over the plane. The resulting ‘relief’ is depicted in the upper row of Figure 5 both as a
target map and as its three-dimensional relief.
The middle elements in the table cells, GDP gain, constitutes another relief on the
same triangle of priorities. Its map and the relief itself are depicted in the middle section
of 5. Similarly, the bottom section of Figure 5 show the map and the relief of the foot
element of the table cells.
The maps and reliefs in Figure 5 illustrate the triple effect of moving within the triangle
of priorities. For instance, moving towards the vertex ‘Employment’ implies a decrease in
the unemployment (upper relief), increase in GDP (middle relief) but an increase of the
unemployment variance (bottom relief).
The specific particularity of all the three reliefs is that their isolines are almost parallel
to the first axis. It means that in the space of optimal policies, both targets, ‘maximization
of employment’ and ‘maximization of GDP’, are operationally highly correlated. In other
words, subsidizing ‘cheap’ jobs leads to supporting most competitive industries and vice
versa.
We conclude that the three-dimensional policy space can be reduced to two-
dimensions, with ‘maximization of employment’ and ‘maximization of GDP’ merging
into one factor.
Flexibilizing the budget Political decisions are often made with a certain budget flex-
ibility. Depending on the effects expected, the initially intended budget can be somewhat
increased or reduced.
The model discussed can predict the triplets of target indices for variable budgets,
enabling to trace the effect-to-budget ratio. The task is simplified due to a high correlation
of the ‘Employment’ and ‘GDP’ target indices. Therefore, it suffices to consider variable
budgets only for the target weight ratios ‘Employment : Equalization’.
Consider normalized target weight ratios a : c, a + c = 1, a ≥ 0, c ≥ 0. Since
c uniquely determines a, the variety of weight ratios is one-dimensional. It allows to
represent variable target ratios versus variable budgets by a two-dimensional Table 5.
The vertical dimension, ‘Equalization priority’ shows the weight c in 0.05 steps (then
a = 1− c). The horizontal dimension shows the hypothetical budget for the East German
regional policy 2004. Every cell of the table contains four elements. The first three are
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Table 4:
Unemployment, in %
GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
optimized on the triangle of priorities for East
Germany 2004
Equalization GDP priority
priority 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1
18.3
3112
4.2
0.9
18.0
3909
4.8
18.1
3897
4.8
0.8
17.6
5658
8.3
17.5
6157
9.1
17.5
6497
9.9
0.7
17.0
7594
15.1
17.1
7672
14.7
17.1
7722
14.5
17.2
7698
14.3
0.6
16.7
8870
22.4
16.7
8930
22.6
16.7
8931
22.4
16.8
8856
21.5
16.8
8745
20.6
0.5
16.6
9402
27.1
16.6
9414
27.0
16.6
9426
26.9
16.6
9438
26.9
16.6
9450
27.0
16.6
9462
27.1
0.4
16.5
9730
32.2
16.5
9733
31.8
16.5
9735
31.4
16.5
9737
31.2
16.5
9738
31.0
16.5
9739
30.9
16.5
9739
30.8
0.3
16.4
9991
38.7
16.4
10004
38.3
16.4
10018
38.0
16.4
10031
37.7
16.4
10045
37.6
16.4
10058
37.6
16.4
10072
37.8
16.4
10081
38.0
0.2
16.3
10381
52.4
16.3
10402
52.7
16.2
10425
53.0
16.3
10447
53.0
16.3
10451
52.4
16.3
10449
51.5
16.3
10445
50.7
16.3
10441
50.2
16.3
10436
49.9
0.1
16.2
10713
71.4
16.2
10716
70.9
16.2
10719
70.5
16.2
10722
70.2
16.2
10729
69.8
16.2
10739
69.5
16.2
10748
69.5
16.2
10758
69.7
16.2
10763
69.8
16.2
10764
69.6
0
16.1
10747
89.5
16.1
10754
88.9
16.1
10817
88.6
16.1
10817
88.6
16.1
10817
88.6
16.1
10820
88.4
16.1
10839
88.5
16.2
10872
89.3
16.2
10872
89.3
16.2
10872
89.3
16.2
10872
89.3
Employment ↖ ↖ ↖ ↖ ↖ ↖ ↖ ↖ ↖ ↖ ↖
priority 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
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18.3%
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4.2%2
89.5%2
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Figure 5: The triangle of priorities with maps and reliefs of three target variables optimized
for East Germany 2004
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Table 5:
Unemployment, in %
GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
Profitability, in %
under variable budget for East Germany 2004
Equalization Investment in regional policy, in Mio EUR
Priority 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
1
19.1
0
12.9
18.1
3767
3.4
−26.4
17.0
7948
0.9
−22.3
15.8
12403
0.2
−19.2
14.5
17595
0.0
−14.0
14.0
19679
−0.0
−23.1
14.0
19679
−0.0
−35.9
14.0
19679
−0.0
−45.0
14.0
19679
−0.0
−51.9
14.0
19679
−0.0
−57.3
14.0
19679
−0.0
−61.5
0.95
19.1
0
12.9
18.0
4084
3.5
−20.2
16.8
8626
1.1
−15.7
15.4
14371
0.7
−6.3
14.0
20103
0.6
−1.7
12.6
25744
0.6
0.7
11.1
31353
0.6
2.2
9.7
36963
0.6
3.2
8.3
42572
0.6
4.0
6.9
48182
0.6
4.7
5.5
53792
0.6
5.2
0.9
19.1
0
12.9
17.8
4690
4.1
−8.3
16.5
9923
2.1
−3.0
14.9
16382
2.1
6.8
13.4
22591
2.3
10.4
11.9
28574
2.6
11.7
10.5
34204
2.6
11.4
9.1
39814
2.6
11.2
7.7
45423
2.6
11.0
6.3
51033
2.6
10.9
4.9
56458
2.5
10.4
0.85
19.1
0
12.9
17.6
5476
5.4
7.1
16.1
11824
4.6
15.6
14.5
18329
4.6
19.4
12.9
24750
5.1
21.0
11.4
30874
5.5
20.7
9.9
36816
5.9
20.0
8.4
42735
6.3
19.4
7.1
48026
6.0
17.4
5.7
53060
5.5
15.3
4.4
58059
5.0
13.5
0.8
19.1
0
12.9
17.3
6874
8.3
34.4
15.6
13810
8.5
35.0
14.0
20472
8.8
33.4
12.5
26944
9.3
31.7
10.9
33276
10.0
30.1
9.4
38966
10.0
27.0
8.0
44253
9.7
23.6
6.7
49540
9.5
21.1
5.3
54619
9.1
18.6
4.1
59342
8.0
16.0
0.75
19.1
0
12.9
17.0
8122
11.9
58.8
15.2
15491
13.1
51.4
13.6
22406
14.0
46.0
11.9
29266
15.4
43.0
10.4
35175
15.5
37.5
9.0
40581
15.2
32.2
7.6
45723
14.3
27.7
6.3
50755
13.4
24.0
5.0
55628
12.4
20.8
3.8
60500
11.8
18.3
0.7
19.1
0
12.9
16.7
8936
15.4
74.7
14.9
16566
17.3
61.9
13.2
24063
20.0
56.8
11.5
31112
22.2
52.1
10.0
36823
22.3
44.0
8.6
42019
21.2
36.9
7.3
46981
19.6
31.2
6.0
51853
18.1
26.7
4.7
56726
17.1
23.2
3.5
61533
16.2
20.3
0.65
19.1
0
12.9
16.5
9674
19.9
89.1
14.7
17425
22.3
70.3
12.9
25121
25.6
63.7
11.1
32325
28.6
58.0
9.6
38080
29.1
48.9
8.2
43324
28.2
41.2
6.9
48248
26.5
34.7
5.7
53120
25.0
29.8
4.4
57936
23.6
25.8
3.2
62472
21.2
22.1
0.6
19.1
0
12.9
16.3
10330
24.5
102.0
14.5
18069
27.2
76.6
12.7
25730
30.1
67.7
10.9
33196
34.3
62.2
9.3
39070
35.9
52.8
7.9
44525
36.4
45.1
6.5
49705
36.4
38.8
5.3
54518
34.4
33.2
4.1
59055
31.1
28.3
3.0
63209
26.0
23.6
0.55
19.1
0
12.9
16.2
10715
27.6
109.5
14.3
18549
32.2
81.3
12.5
26260
35.1
71.1
10.7
33759
39.1
65.0
9.0
40075
44.4
56.7
7.6
45698
46.2
48.9
6.2
50996
47.0
42.4
4.9
55820
45.1
36.4
3.8
60054
39.0
30.5
2.9
63759
30.5
24.6
0.5
19.1
0
12.9
16.1
11020
30.7
115.4
14.2
18916
37.4
84.9
12.4
26656
40.6
73.7
10.6
34339
45.1
67.8
8.8
41039
54.2
60.5
7.2
46857
58.1
52.7
5.9
52021
57.3
45.3
4.7
56759
54.1
38.7
3.6
60753
46.1
32.0
2.7
64344
36.5
25.8
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Figure 6: Three target variables optimized under variable budget for East Germany 2004
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the three target indices optimized for target weight ratio (1− c) : 0 : c and given budget.
The two- and three-dimensional plots of the ‘relief’ produced by the three target variables
are shown in Figure 6.
The fourth element of the cell is the ‘Profitability’ of the investment in the regional
policy which characterizes the tax returns from additional jobs. For instance, suppose
that the GDP increment due to the jobs subsidized for 1 Mio EUR aid is 3 Mio EUR.
The taxes from these additional 3 Mio EUR bring the state 39.1% tax (OECD estimation
of the tax ratio in Germany for 2002), or 1.173 Mio EUR. Then the
‘Profit’ of the state = 1.173− 1 = 0.173 Mio EUR, or 17.3% .
The relief of the GDP exhibits decreasing marginal returns from the budget incre-
ment. It means that governmental investments in the regional policy are not profitable
beyond certain limits. Besides, because of linearity of the prediction model, its forecast
is getting less reliable as the distance from the initial point increases. This means that
the model results for extreme target weight ratios and budgets should be interpreted with
reservations.
Finally, mention that the cases of West Germany or of the whole of Germany are
analogous, and we do not discuss them here.
5 Conclusions
1. Non-optimal implementation misinterpreted as uselessness of active labour
market policies
Comparing with the optimal budget distribution, the efficiency of the actual budget
distribution in 2000–2002 is about 4% (Section “Analysis of the past practice”).
Such a bad implementation of active labour market policies can be responsible
for their low efficiency reported in some empirical studies misinterpreted as their
uselessness.
2. Closeness of targets Maximization of Employment and of GDP
The model reveals a high operational correlation between two policy targets, maxi-
mization of employment and maximization of GDP (Paragraph “Triangle of prior-
ities”). It means that subsidizing jobs in productive branches best contributes to
the competitiveness of the national economy and most efficiently reduces unemploy-
ment. From the operational viewpoint these targets fuse into one and the number
of effective targets is reduced from three to two.
3. Importance of the target Equalization of Regional Unemployment Rates
Disregarding the equalization criterion causes structural disproportions with a num-
ber of negative consequences (Paragraph “One-target and three-target optimiza-
tion”). From the operational viewpoint, it results in large deviations from the
starting planning point, making the model inaccurate and unreliable. Therefore,
equalization is also needed to keep the situation under operational control (Para-
graph “Notes on the model assumptions”).
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4. Consequence of overemphasizing the target Equalization
On the other hand, overemphasizing the equalization reduces the competitiveness of
the national economy (Paragraph “Triangle of priorities”). For instance, attempts
to quickly equalize East and West Germany by subsidizing one at the price of not
subsidizing the other turned out to have higher social costs than expected. The
equilibrium in West Germany was violated, which reduced the competitiveness of
West German industry and caused high unemployment (as follows from Paragraph
“Triangle of priorities”). On the other hand, the released funds transferred to East
Germany turned out to be insufficient, resulting in no East–West compensation.
Regarded from the viewpoint of economic competitiveness, West and East Germany
should be considered jointly and adjusting budgeting proportions can be another
issue for optimization.
5. Managerial aspects of active labour market policies
Regional policy can be regarded as a profitable governmental enterprize. The model
discussed enables policy makers to estimate tax returns from the jobs subsidized and
thereby to take into account profits from investments in active labour market policies
(Paragraph “Flexibilizing the budget”).
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